it focllses morc on the interrelationship between external and internal security challenges.
Other specialists point to the catalytic events of 1996 as having a major impact in shaping China's 'new security concept'. For example, Chu Shulong Chu also noted, however, that 'the real Chinese position is complicated and flexible. It opposes US-Japan security alliance but does not challenge US-Korean alliance in Northeast Asia'.
Banning Garret and Bonnie Glaser, two American China specialists, argue along similar lines. They claim that China's paradigm shift was not only a reaction to the revised US-Japan defence guidelines, but also due to the dispatch of two carrier groups to the Taiwan Straits in March 1996 as a response to Chinese military threats against Taiwan (Garret and Glaser 1997, 44) . These twin developments led Chinese military and civilian leaders to re-evaluate whether the US-Japan alliance and US forward deployed forces were a strategic benefit or a greater threat to Chinese security. According to Garret and Glaser, 'this strategic conundrum has led Beijing to search for a means to counterbalance the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance and bolster Chinese leverage over Washington while not foreclosing the possibility of improving relations with the United States ' (1977,44) . David Finkelstein (2001, 3) argues that China developed the 'new concept of security' for three reasons: to advance its views of a multipolar world order in response to US global dominance; as a reaction to the strengthening of US military alliances (including combined military exercises with Russia and Kazakhstan in Central Asia); and to advance Chinese influence in Southeast Asia.
China's 'New Security Concept' and Southeast Asia
Starting in 1997, China initiated a diplomatic and propaganda campaign to publicize its 'new security concept'. According to Chu, the 'new security concept' was first introduced by Chinese officials at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) conference on confidence building measures held in Beijing in March. The following month a joint statement between the Presidents of China and Russia called for a 'new and universally applicable security concept' (quoted in Finkelstein 2001, 2) . In July, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen discussed the new security concept in his address to the 4th ARF meeting in Malaysia. In 1998 the People's Liberation Army issued a paper on the 'new security concept ' (Li and Wei 1997) China holds that the ARF should continue to focus on confidence~building measures, explore new security concepts and methods, and discuss the question of preventive diplomacy. At the same time, it believes that the parties concerned should have a full discussion first on the concept, definition, principles and scope of preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region and reach consensus in this regard.
A further elaboration of China's new security concept in a Southeast Asian context took place in July 2000 during the course of Vice President Hu Jintao's visit to Indonesia. In a major speech delivered to the Indonesian Council on World Affairs, Hu declared: a new security concept that embraces the principles of equality, dialogue, trust and cooperation, and a new security order should be established to ensure genuine mutual respect, mutual cooperation, consensus through consultation and peaceful settlement of disputes, rather than bullying, confrontation, and imposition of one's own will upon others. Only in that way can countries coexist in amity and secure their development (quoted in
Thayer 2000a).
Two close observers of Southeast Asia's security scene have analysed Hu's visit in these terms (Mitchell and Vatikiotis 2000, 20-22) :
China [through Hu Jintao] has made it official policy to gain influence in Southeast Asia by contrasting its behaviour in the region with that of the US. The implication was clear: Not only can China be a good neighbour, but Southeast Asia would benefit from partnering with Beijing rather than the US, which typically sees political and economic reform as prerequisites for amicable relations. While China has long inferred as much, Hu's speech marked the first time that the message was framed as a formal policy.
According to David Finkelstein, writing in October 2001, China's 'new security concept' failed to 'take hold' in Southeast Asia because the US presence was 'too strong' and too highly valued (2001, 5) . China promoted its 'new concept of security' by an unsubtle attack on the United States for maintaining Cold War era alliances. Typical of this heavy handed approach was the speech delivered by President Jiang Zemin in Bangkok in September 1999 (Thayer I 999a) . Jiang argued: The following section will review briefly the structure of China-ASEAN relations and China's bilateral relations with Southeast Asian states. The concluding section questions the degree to which China's 'new security concept' has actually replaced' power politics' as a new approach to state-ta-state relations.
The Structure of China's Relations with Southeast Asia In July 1994, China and ASEAN agreed to open consultations on political and security issues at the senior official level. There have been regular annual meetings of senior officials since 1995. The following year China was accorded dialogue partner status by ASEAN, and in February 1997 ASEAN and China formalized their cooperation by establishing the ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation Committee (ACJCC). The ACJCC first met in Beijing where it was decided that the ACJCC would 'act as the coordinator for all the ASEAN-China mechanisms at the working level' (Joint Press Release 1997). As a dialoguc partner, China regularly participates in the annual ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) consultation process. This takes the form of a meeting between ASEAN and its ten dialogue partners (ASEAN ten plus ten), and a meeting between all ten ASEAN members and each of its dialogue partners (ASEAN ten plus one). In November 2002, China-ASEAN relations took a major step forward with a joint agreement on cooperation on non-traditional security issues (Joint Declaration, 2002) .
China was also admitted into the ASEAN Regional Forum where it has given cautious endorsement to multilateral security activities. The ARF meets ammally in conjunction with the AMM and PMC. Generally, the ARF considers regional security and political matters, while the ASEAN PMC considers economic and development cooperation and other international issues that do not fall within the purview of the ARF. China has also taken an active role in the ARF's intersessional work program related to confidence building measures. In September 2000 it hosted the 4th ARF meeting of the Heads of Defense Colleges (Thayer 2000a) . The meeting was opened by Chi Haotian, China's Defense Minister, who argued in his address that the ARF's stress on dialogue and consultation represented a 'new security concept' and the trend of 'multi-polarization' in the region. Chi noted that regional flash points still exist, 'hegemonism and power politics have shown new traces of development' and 'democracy and human rights' were being used as excuses for intervention. According to Chi: separatism was gaining ground. All these will endanger or jeopardize the security and stability of the region. That's why we advocate that all countries adopt the new security concept built upon equality, dialogue, mutual confidence and cooperation (Xinhua News Agency, 6 September 2000).
In addition to ASEAN and the ARF, ASEAN-China relations have been restructured as a result of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) process inaugruated in the late 1990s. The APT groups ASEAN with China, Japan and South Korea. The APT process has evolved into annual summit meetings at head of state level. 
Bilateral Cooperation Agreements
Between February 1999 and December 2000, the People's Republic of China (PRC) negotiated long-term cooperative framework arrangements with all ten ASEAN members: Vietnam, Thailand, Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, Burma, Laos and Cambodia (see Appendix A). Each of the ten cooperative arrangements varies by title and content. The PRC-Thailand document, entitled a 'Plan of Action for the 21st Century', is the most formal. Three of the bilateral agreements are described as 'framework' documents, while the remaining six take the fann of joint statements or communiques, Taken as a whole, these bilateral cooperation agreements share six points in common:
• All were signed by high-level officials, usually foreign ministers but also by vice premiers, and in the case of China and Vietnam, by party secretary generals.
• All affirm that bilateral relations will be based on the basic norms found in the UN Charter, Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), and 'recognized principles' found in international law. China's agreements with Singapore and Vietnam omit reference to the TAC, while the China-Indonesia agreement includes a reference to the ten principles adopted by the Bandung conference in 1955.
• All agreements call for frequent high-level exchanges and regular consultations between foreign ministries if not at foreign minister leveL
• All agreements contain a paragraph acknowledging support for a 'one China' policy including recognition that Taiwan is part of China.
• Eight of the agreements contain a specific pledge by China to respect the 'independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity' of the other party. This commitment is omitted from the PRC-Brunei and PRC-Vietnarn documents.
• Eight of the agreements include the pledge to consult and cooperate in various multilateral forums including the United Nations, ASEAN, and ASEAN Plus Three. Seven agreements also include the ASEAN Regional Forum; five include Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), four include the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the PRC-Indonesia includes the Non-Aligned Movement.
The bilateral cooperation agreements also contain substantial differences. Six of the agreements made reference to various fonns of defence cooperation (Brunei, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand), but the wording varied from document to document. The PRC-Brunei agreement, for example, only mentioned 'possible cooperation in ... defence , . Three of the agreements made specific mention of human rights (Indonesia, the Philippines and Laos). The PRCIndonesia agreement stated, for example, 'human rights issues must not be solved at the expense of the principles of state sovereignty and sovereign equality among nations or in contravention or violation of the principles on which the United Nations itself was founded'. Three of the agreements specifically mentioned territorial disputes in the South China Sea (Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia). China's agreements wit'h Malaysia and the Philippines declared t'hat the settlement of disputes would be based on international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea. The PRC-Vietnam agreement clearly indicated that territorial disputes were still a contentious matter. 'Both sides', it declared, 'will refrain from taking any action t'hat might complicate and escalate disputes, resorting to force or making threats with force'. Finally, the PRC-Indonesia joint statement waS the only one to mention weapons of mass destruction.
Issues in China-Southeast Asia Relations
Geo-strategic rivalry. China's assertions that its 'new security concept' represents a break from 'power politics' carmot be accepted at face value. China's espousal of a multipolar international system and 'new security concept' are aimed at transfonning the present balance of power in East Asia in America's favour to one in which China will play a more prominent role. According to Finkelstein and McDevitt (1999) , China views the US system of bilateral military alliances 'as destabilizing and anachronistic. It believes t'hey are latent t'hreats'. China would like to sce the transformation of t'he present unipolar balance into a triangular relationship involving China, the United States and Japan. This new power configuration would evolve as a consequence of the weakening of the US-Japan alliance and t'he development of a more equal relationship between Beijing and Washington.
China was initially resistant to t'he idea of multilateralism in the security realm in the Asia-Pacific. China soon discovered, however, that participation in multilateral activities could serve to constrain the United States. China therefore espoused multilateralism as a key component of its 'new security concept' in order to offer an alternative to alliance relations wit'h the United States. China views the US-Thai and US-Philippines bilateral alliances as weak links. According to Robyn Lim (1998,131):
China .. , [is J beginning to use multilateral approaches to 'question the appropriateness' of the 'prevailing security arrangements.' So-called new security concepts call for bilateral alliances to be replaced by non-allied relationships and an as-yet undefined mechanism that provides 'equal security' for all states.
With respect to Southeast Asia, China's espousal of its 'new concept of security' is to develop a 'strategic partnership' with ASEAN and to develop bilateral relations as a substitute for bilateral alliances (Finkelstein and McDevitt 1999 ). China's drive to attain these objectives has revived the embers of geostrategic rivalry with India and Vietnam. For example, China's decision to forge a strategic partnership with the Bunnese regime in the late 1980s and early 1990s provoked India into competing for influence in Yangoon (Garver 2001, 258-74 ). China's geo-strategic concerns surfaced when it was announced that Russia would finally withdraw from naval facilities at Cam Ranh Bay in May 2002 (Storey and Thayer, 2001) . During the course of President Jiang Zemin's visit to Hanoi in late February, for example, it was reported that Jiang extracted a promise from Secretary General Nong Duc Manh not to allow the United States access (Breckon 2002c ).
China has also sought to play on elite differenees in Cambodia and Laos about their relations with Vietnam. China's actions have triggered Vietnamese suspicions and rekindled sub-regional rivalry (Thayer 200 I c) . Mitchell and Vatikiotis (2000, 20-22) Burmese navy has been of particular concern to India and Thailand.
In 1999, China granted Cambodia military assistance valued at US$1.5 million (Thayer 2000d) . In October of that year Ke Kim Yan, Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, led a senior military delegation to Beijing to discuss China's offer of military assistance. Ke Kim Yan held discussions with Fu Quanyou, Chief of the General Staff, People's Liberation Army (PLA). This was the highest level Cambodian military delegation to visit China since 1993. It was immediately followed by a return visit by a senior delegation from the PLA's General Logistic Department. According to one report, China offered to supply a number of tanks, artillery pieces, trucks and weapons (Thayer 2000d China has long preferred to settle territorial disputes in the South China Sea on a bilateral basis. However, as a result of ASEAN's reaction to Chinese 'creeping assertiveness' in the South China Sea in 1992 and 1995, China's territorial claims became in effect 'multilaterialized'. At the first ASEAN-China SOM held in Hangzhou in April 1995, for example, China was confronted by a unified ASEAN stance on this issue. This led to an alteration in China's declaratory policy. At the 2nd ARF meeting China announced that it would settle its maritime disputes peacefully on the basis of international law including the UN Convention on Law of the Sea. At the 7th ARF meeting, when Thailand attempted to raise tbe Spratly Islands question, 'the Chinese slapped down thc Thai proposal brusquely and rudely. Never, they threatened, will Beijing discuss the Spratlys in a forum-even though six nations claim the archipelago' ('China's Alarming Military Growth', The Bangkok Post, 27 August 2000).
Despite this stance, China has consented to discuss a South China Sea code of conduct at special meetings with ASEAN officials. A number of working group meetings on a draft code of conduct were held between March 2000 and August 2002. At the first meeting held in Thailand in March 2000, China and ASEAN both tabled drafts for discussion. These documents covered four specific concerns: dispute resolution, building trust and confidence, cooperation on marine issues and environmental protection, and modes of consultation. Both documents urged selfrestraint and the non-use of force or threat of force pending resolution of disputes. The drafts also advocated cooperation to protect the environment, marine scientific research, safety of navigation, and search and reScue.
One of the major differences between the two drafts was the scope of geographic coverage. China wanted the code confined to the Spratly Islands, while Vietnam insisted on the inclusion of the Paracels. ASEAN also insisted on a halt to future settlement and construction. China, for its part, sought to curtail harassment of its private fishing vessels by Philippines' navy patrol craft Beijiug proposed that the claimants 'refrain from use or threat of force, or taking coercive measures (seizure, detention and arrest) ... against fishing boats or other civilian vessels engaged in normal operation in the disputed areas, nor against nationals of other countries thereon' (People's Republic of China 2000a). On 18 May 200 I, two Chinese Jianghu-class frigates and an intelligence gathering ship were spotted off Scarborough ShoaL Helicopters launched from these ships were observed flying in the area. These Chinese actions raised fears in Manila that Beijing was contemplating erecting structures on Scarborough Shoal similar to those on Mischief Reef. In June, more than a dozen Chinese warships, including Luhu-class destroyers and Jianghu-class frigates, transited the South China Sea (Geertz 200Ib) , These naval deployments coincided with the largest and most complex Chinese war games in the Taiwan Straits simulating a mock attack against Taiwan. Guo, the latter remarked that China was opposed to any country that had diplomatic relations with China from developing official relations with Taiwan. Guo continued, 'We hope that the related countries shall keep alert for the political attempt of Taiwan authorities of splirting from the motherland, and observe oneChina commitment' (Xinhua News Agency, 19 February 2001) . Guo was referring to reports that Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian was planning a 'vacation trip' to Singapore. On 8 February, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson demanded that Singapore clarify reports concerning Chen's proposed visit. Singapore denied that there were any such plans. Guo was also alluding to longstanding SingaporeTaiwan defence links that were then under discussion. In 1996, Taiwan agreed to host Singaporean infantry, armour and artillery units for joint combat training and to maintain and repair tanks and Hawk missiles. Under a program known as Operation Hsing Kuang (Starlight), Singapore anned forces utilized three training camps in Taiwan.
In late 2000, Taiwan's Navy Commander-in-Chief, General Le Chieh, reportedly made a 'vacation trip' to Singapore. Singapore's Chief of the General Staff then paid a reciprocal visit to Taiwan where he held discussions on their joint military training agreement. In early 2001, Taiwan's Minister of National Defense, We Shih-wen, made an unpublicized trip to Singapore. It was in the context of these developments that in January, China used the occasion ofthe exchange of the first defence attaches with Singapore, to offer training facilities on Hainan Island. China had made a similar offer in 1999. Singapore rejected Beijing's offer and renewed its training agreement with Taiwan (Tzu-Yu Shih-Pao, 12 February 2001 
US Presence.
China is opposed to bilateral military alliances and argues that these are destabilizing. As noted above, China regards the US-Thai and US-Philippines bilateral alliances as weak links. China has moved closer to Thailand since the election of the Thaksin government. For example, China's Defense Minister Cbi Haotian altered the itinerary of his trip to Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia and Nepal to include Thailand after it became clear that General Chavalit would become Minister of Defence in the new government. Although Chi's visit was billed a personal one, his agenda included meetings with all of the current and former top military brass. Chi and Chavalit discussed strengthening Sino-Thai security cooperation, drug suppression, and the ongoing border clashes between Burma and Thailand. Chi also used the occasion to lobby his 'old friend' to assist in curtailing the activities of the Falun Gong religious movement in Thailand (Thayer 2001c) . In August 200 1, President Jiang Zemin promised Prime Minister Thaksin that Beijing would continue to provide assistance to the Thai armed forces in maintaining weapons and equipment sold by China.
Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea in 1995 was instrumental in changing elite opinion in the Philippines towards a more favourable view of their alliance with the United States. Official US policy under the Clinton Administration was that the United States took no position with respect to territorial disputes. Rather, the United States stated its concern for safety and freedom of navigation on the high seas. In the view of some observers, this excessively legalistic and ambiguous interpretation provided China with an opportunity to devalue the US-Philippines 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty by occupying and constructing facilities on Mischief Reef.
In 1999, Thomas Hubbard, the United States Ambassador in Manila, sent a letter to the government of the Philippines clarifying that the Mutual Defense Treaty had both 'territorial and situational applications'. This letter was sent a week before the Philippines Senate passed a Visiting Forces Agreement (Kyodo News Agency, 4 June 1999). Philippines spokesperson Fernando Barican disclosed that the Hubbard letter made references to official statements by former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in 1977 that the 1951 treaty covered Philippine armed forces, vessels, planes and supply ships 'that may be attacked, no matter where, by a hostile force ' (quoted in Thayer 1999b) . At issue was whether or not the United States was bound to defend Philippines-claimed islands in the South China Sea that were occupied after the 1951 defence treaty was signed.
After the ratification of the Visiting Forces Agreement, the United States and the Philippines resumed military cooperation including joint exercises. China has repeatedly expressed concern about this development. In ASEAN-China negotiations on a South China Sea code of conduct, China has attempted to include references prohibiting 'any military exercises directed against other countries' in or near the Spratlys, and 'dangerous and close-in military reconnaissance' (People's Republic of China 2000a). In August 2000, China tried to insert in the revised draft code of conduct wording that would restrict US military exercises in the 'waters around' the Spratly Islands.
These Chinese actions have forced Philippine officials to allay Beijing's concerns. For example, a joint US-Philippines exercise codenamed Balikatan 2000 (Shoulder-ta-Shoulder) was held in late January-early March 2000. This exercise involved up to 5,000 troops in a variety of activities (Thayer 2000c (Breckon 2002b ).
China has also exhibited concerns about the growth of US influence in Southeast Asia as a result of its prosecution of the war on terrorism. In an address to ASEAN ministers in July-August 2002, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan portrayed China~not 'certain outside countries' (read the United States)~as the region's natural partner in the new century (Breckon 2002a ). As noted above, Tang chose this opportunity to revive China's 'new security concept' by endorsing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the ARF as models for shaping regional security arrangements in the future.
Conclusion
China's relations with the ten independent states of ASEAN have undergone a sea change in recent years. China is no longer viewed as a threat but as a political, economic and diplomatie partner (Yee and Storey 2002) . China has established formal links with ASEAN and is currently implementing an extensive program of cooperative activities. China has joined the ARF and has stepped np its participation in the process of dialogue and consultations as well as practical confidence building measures. China has been an aetive supporter of the ASEAN Plus Three process and is successfully negotiating a free trade agreement between China and ASEAN.
China has also developed extensive bilateral ties with each Southeast Asian state. These have been codified in long-tenn cooperative framework agreements.
These extend beyond state-to-state relations to include the private sector and partyto-party relations. China also gives consistent high-level political attention to the region. Its president, premier, defence minister and other cabinet officials regularly travel to Southeast Asia; their regional counterparts are just as regularly received in Beijing (Breckon, 2001; 2002a-c; 2003; Thayer 2000a-<1; 200Ia-d Vietnam frets about losing its influence in Laos and Cambodia, China's claims to the South China Sea and its assertiveness in this area have aroused suspicions in Hanoi, Manila and elsewhere, The inability of China and ASEAN to negotiate a formal code of conduct for the South China Sea is indicative of mutual suspicions and lack of trns\, Nationalist sentiment has been stirred up in the Philippines and Vietnam. There is concern by some ASEAN states that China seeks to influence ASEAN and its future direction by developing close relations with Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia as avenues of influence.
All nations in Southeast Asia adhere to the 'one China policy' while most conduct commercial and other relations with Taiwan. China brings instantaneous pressure to bear at the slightest sign of transgression. Vietnam's economic linkages to Taiwan have featured in joint statements between Beijing and Hanoi, Singapore's longstanding defence links with Taiwan have also proven to be an irritant.
Since 1997 China has promoted a 'new concept of security' as its main policy towards security cooperation with Southeast Asia, As noted by two experienced security analysts, 'many observers believe that it is intended to replace the current US-led bilateral security alliance strncture of the Asia-Pacific region' (Swaine and Tellis 2000, 118) , Southeast Asian states by and large value the US military presenee as contributing to regional stability, They do not wish to face a situation were they will be foreed to make a choice, This is the major reason why China's 'new concept of security' has not gained traetion in Southeast Asia, In the wake of 9-11, the United States has recouped its influence as a major security player in the region through its war on terrorism. This development has resulted in a renewed effort by China to repackage and promote its 'new concept of security' through the ARF process (Ling 2002, and People's Daily 2002) , China's 'new concept of security' cannot be taken at face value as a new fonn of state-to-state relationship devoid of power politics, China employs the 'new security concept' to pursue its national interests by traditional power politics, including such instruments as economic and military aid and political pressure. This is evident in a review of the key issues in China-Southeast Asia relations in the case studies presented above.
China's growing economic and commercial links with Southeast Asia should be welcomed by states external to the region, These ties increase Chinese interest in seeing the region remain peaceful and stable, External states should continue to give due reeognition to China's power and status, However, external states should oppose Beijing's attempts to undermine existing US bilateral military alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. These alliance relationships are a vital underpinning of regional security until some form of effective multilateral security mechanism emerges,
